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CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ARTICLE 13(1)(A) OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
Arnold N. Pronto*
ABSTRACT
Although the movement to “codify” the rules and principles of
international law predates the Charter of the United Nations, it was with the
adoption of Article 13(1)(a) thereof, and subsequent establishment of the
International Law Commission, that the codification movement came into its
own. While the notion of “codification” was well-understood by 1945, it was
nonetheless included in the Charter in a novel way, in a dichotomy with the
concept of “progressive development.” This paper seeks to provide a
comprehensive legislative history of Article 13(1)(a), drawing from the
travaux préparatoires of the San Francisco Conference. It focuses, in
particular, on the origins of the introduction of the concept of “progressive
development” and the connection with the problem of revision.
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INTRODUCTION

The impulse to systematize the rules and principles of international law
in a “code” predates the Charter of the United Nations. Depending on one’s
understanding of the concept of “codification,” such efforts stretch back
hundreds of years, if not longer. In its modern guise, one may trace its history
to the ideas of Jeremy Bentham, and others.1 It is a common feature of
modern international relations that states not only resort to treaties by way of
guaranteeing their accommodations reached inter se, but also to lay down, in
an expository manner, the rules of international law more generally. Modern
treaty collections contain numerous examples of such treaties (or treaties with
some provisions purporting to codify the law more generally). The
codification of international law has become part and parcel of the modern
liberal project which has sought to regulate the relations between nation
states through a rule-based system.
It is not too far-fetched to argue that interest in such activities has
historically peaked in the aftermath of major conflict. The resort to law, as
opposed to war, in settling international disputes has a long pedigree, again
primarily as a manifestation of the liberal worldview. The peace agreement
negotiated at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, included several embryonic
efforts at codifying the rules of international law generally, in relation to
international rivers, the abolition of slave trade, and the recognition of
diplomatic envoys. So, too, the political settlement established after the First
World War in the Versailles Treaty2 was anchored in a newly established
international legal architecture. The modern codification movement was
propelled forward by concerted action undertaken in the wake of both world
wars.
This is not to deny the existence of major codification efforts during
peacetime. Numerous major international conferences have been held, and
treaties concluded, during peacetime, including in the years immediately
prior to the First World War.3 Rather, the assertion being made is that the
international settlement following major conflicts (initially in Europe, but in
more recent times, throughout the world) provided the framework for
subsequent efforts at codifying rules of international law at the global level.
1 For an overview of early codification proposals and efforts, see UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT,
THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1–3, U.N. Sales No. E.17.V.2 (9th ed. 2017).
2
3

Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. 42.

Perhaps the most well-known examples are the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, which
reached agreement on several conventions relating generally to the laws of war and to the pacific
settlement of disputes. See THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, TRANSLATION OF
THE ORIGINAL TEXTS VOLUMES I–IV: THE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 (W.S. Hein 2000); see also
Historical Survey of the Development of International Law and its Codification by International
Conferences, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/5, reprinted in 41 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 29 (1947).
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In the early years, such efforts were primarily motivated by the hope that the
imposition of rules would help ameliorate the conditions that might lead to a
reversion to war. In more recent times, such basic concerns have been
supplemented by the impulse, inter alia, to improve the plight of human
beings and the environment.
The United Nations’ predecessor, the League of Nations, although not
expressly entrusted with the task of codifying international law, nonetheless
undertook several initiatives aimed at doing precisely that (at least in relation
to certain aspects). In 1927, the League of Nations convened a diplomatic
conference to codify several topics of international law, identified by a
Committee of Experts as being sufficiently “ripe” for international
agreement. The conference was held at The Hague, from 13 March to 12
April 1930, and resulted in the negotiation of four instruments concerning
nationality.4 Although of limited success,5 the Hague Codification
Conference was the first global (as it then was) attempt at codifying entire
fields of international law more generally, rather than addressing specific
legal problems. However, it was with the adoption of the Charter of the
United Nations, in 1945, that the codification movement came into its own.
Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter empowers the General Assembly of the United
Nations, inter alia, to:
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose
of encouraging the progressive development of international
law and its codification.
This provision has served as an important basis for contemporary work
on the codification of international law. In particular, it has provided the
mandate for the work of the International Law Commission (ILC), the
primary subsidiary body of the General Assembly entrusted with the task of
fulfilling the mandate in Article 13. The ILC has carried out this mandate
continuously over the last seventy years, resulting in the development of a
significant body of rules and principles of international law.
Despite being relatively well-established in 1945, the concept of
“codification” was reflected in the Charter of the United Nations in a novel
way, as one part of a dichotomy with the element of “progressive
development.” This did two things. First, it introduced a new concept
4 The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12,
1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89–113; Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double
Nationality, Apr. 12, 1930, 178 L.N.T.S. 227–38; Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness,
Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 115–26; Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, League of Nations Doc.
C.27.M.16.1931.V (1930).
5 The Conference was unable to agree on any conventions concerning the other two topics before
it (territorial water and state responsibility).
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(“progressive development”) into the lexicon of international law-making.
Secondly, it led to a subtle shift in the received understanding of the meaning
of “codification,” which since then has been construed in contra-distinction
to “progressive development.”
This paper considers the first proposition, and seeks to provide a
comprehensive legislative history of Article 13(1)(a), focusing on the travaux
préparatoires of the San Francisco Conference.6 In doing so, it will explore
the origins of the introduction of the “progressive development” element and
demonstrate, in particular, its connection with the problem of the revision of
treaties (and that of international law more generally).
II. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF ARTICLE 13(1)(A)
Two preliminary reflections are worth noting at the outset. First, while
many provisions of the Charter barely feature in the official records of the
San Francisco Conference, or do so in a rather perfunctory manner (as having
largely been agreed to before the conference), this is not the case with Article
13(1)(a), which was discussed, in its various manifestations, on several
occasions throughout the conference, leaving the reader with a relative
wealth of material to contemplate and draw inferences from.
The second, more substantive, initial reflection is the link between what
came to be adopted as “progressive development of international law” and
prevailing concerns about the revision of international law. It is not always
fully appreciated that, as will be demonstrated below, the origins of the
codification versus progressive development dichotomy are to be found in
the debate on the revision of international law, as it played out during the
inter-war period. An analysis of the discussion in San Francisco reveals, inter
alia, that the drafters had an inherently quasi-revisionary exercise in mind
when coming to the notion of the “progressive development.”
A.

Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

The Four Power Declaration7 adopted, in Moscow in 1943, by the
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the (then) Republic
of China, called for the establishment of a new international organization to
succeed the League of Nations. The process of establishing such organization
was set into motion at a conference held from August to October 1944 in
6 See U.N. Conference on International Organization, Documents of the United Nations
Conference on International Organization, U.N. Doc. G/8/11 (Vols. I–XXI) (May 28, 1945) [hereinafter
Documents].
7 Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries, Declaration of the Four Nations on General
Security (Oct. 30, 1943).
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Dumbarton Oaks (Washington, D.C.), attended by the same four powers.
Owing to the fact that the Soviet Union did not recognize the representatives
from China, the conference proceeded in two phases, with the first involving
negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United
Kingdom, which resulted in the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General
International Organization” (hereinafter the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals”).8
In the second phase, the United States and the United Kingdom held
discussions with the representatives of China, during which the latter
representatives made a series of proposals. All four governments agreed to
submit the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, together with three Chinese
proposals to the United Nations Conference on International Organization,
convened in San Francisco, in 1945.
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals contained minimal reference to
“international law.” Provision was made for the establishment of an
international court of justice,9 to which “justiciable disputes” were to be
referred, and from which the envisaged Security Council could seek advice
on “legal questions”10; and for the exclusion of disputes arising out of matters
which, under international law, were solely within the domestic jurisdiction
of the state concerned.11 However, of the three proposals put forward by the
Chinese Government, two dealt specifically with international law, of which
the second read:
[t]he [General] Assembly should be responsible for
initiating studies and making recommendations with respect
to the development and revision of the rules and principles
of international law.12
B.

San Francisco Conference

The San Francisco Conference was held from 25 April to 26 June 1945
and was open to the 50 allied nations (known collectively as “the United
Nations”), including the four sponsoring powers. The Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals (including the Chinese proposals) served as the basis for the

8 See generally U.N. Conference on International Organization, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
Comments and Proposed Amendments, in 3 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International
Organization (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. III].
9

Id. at 11–12.

10

Id. at 14.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 25. The other proposal was as follows: “The Charter should provide specifically that
adjustment or settlement of international disputes should be achieved with due regard for principles of
justice and international law.”
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negotiations. The conference proceeded in phases. Most delegations
submitted written proposals for amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals in advance of the conference. Upon convening, delegations took
the opportunity of the plenary debate, held over eight sessions from 26 April
to 2 May 1945, to elaborate on their written proposals, and to make further
proposals.
The draft text of the Charter was divided into four sections, each of
which was to be studied by a Commission.13 The provision of the Charter,
which subsequently became Article 13, was considered by Commission II
(Functions of the General Assembly), chaired by the then Prime Minister of
South Africa, General Jan C. Smuts (1870–1950).14 Further debate on the
various proposals, including those relating to what became Article 13, was
held in the plenary of Commission II over four meetings (from 30 May to 21
June 1945). Smuts, in turn, distributed the work among four Committees.15
Although some discussion was held elsewhere, Article 13 was negotiated in
the second such Committee (Committee II/2), dealing with the functions and
powers of the General Assembly.16
The Plenary of the Conference, at its ninth session, held on 25 June
1945, adopted the reports of, inter alia, all four Commissions, and then
proceeded to adopt the Charter of the United Nations as a whole.
C.

Proposals Submitted to the San Francisco Conference

A number of the proposals submitted in writing to the San Francisco
Conference made express reference to the role of international law. While the
focus of the present paper will be on proposals relating to the development
of international law (the subject matter of Article 13(1)(a)), it is worth

13 The first was responsible for the organization’s purposes, principles, membership, secretariat,
and the question of amendments to the Charter. The second considered functions of the General Assembly.
The third dealt with the Security Council. The fourth dealt with the assessment of the draft Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which had been drafted by a team of legal experts from 44 countries,
meeting in Washington, D.C., in April 1945.
14 General Smuts enjoyed the rare distinction of having played a role in the establishment of both
the League of Nations and the United Nations, and, in addition to presiding over Commission II, was
largely responsible for the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.
15 Committee II/1 (Structure and procedures of the General Assembly), Committee II/2 (Functions
and powers of the General Assembly), Committee II/3 (ECOSOC), and Committee II/4: Trusteeship
system. In the initial plan for the Charter, the latter two entities were envisaged as falling within the
structure of the General Assembly. It was only later on that it was decided to raise both to the level of
principal organs of the United Nations, alongside the General Assembly.
16 The Committee held 25 meetings from 4 May to 20 June 1945. It also established
Subcommittees II/2/A and II/2/B. Some (more general) discussion was also held in the first Committee
(Committee II/1).
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remembering that such proposals were put forward in a broader context of
efforts by many participating Governments to anchor the envisaged Charter
in international law.17
A number of the written proposals dealt with the possibility of granting
the new organization a mandate to develop international law. Hence, Egypt,
in its comments of 16 April 1945, opined that:
It would also be advisable that the new Organization should
endeavour to further and develop International Law either by
the channel of some special agency depending on the
General Assembly, or through the existing Economic and
Social Council. The rules now generally accepted as the Law
of Nations, which are the outcome of the evolution of
centuries of international practice, have often helped to
avoid armed conflicts and to develop peaceful relations
between different States. The weakness of International Law
was that, contrary to all other branches of Law, its rules
could not be enforced. Now, finally, military power is put at
the disposal of a World Organization which is the latest
expression of the Law of Nations, and the climax of a long
process of international thought. It is more than ever
necessary to determine and define those rules of
International Law, now that they are being given that
essential element of authority which hitherto they have
lacked.18
It, accordingly, proposed the insertion of, inter alia, the following
subparagraph into the provision relating to the powers of the General
Assembly:
To determine, define, codify and develop the rules of
international law and international morality.

17 For example, the Brazilian Delegation submitted an amendment to Chapter II (Principles), para.
2, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, whereby “[a]ll members of the Organization [would] undertake, in
order to insure to all of them the right and benefits resulting from membership in the Organization, to
respect and carry out scrupulously the treaties and agreements to which they are parties and to fulfil the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.” U.N. Conference on International
Organization, Amendment to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted by the Brazilian Delegation, U.N.
Doc. 2 G/7(3)(1) (May 3, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note 8, at 243.
18 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Suggestions of the Egyptian Government on the
Tentative Proposals of Dumbarton Oaks under examination at the United Nations Conference at San
Francisco, U.N. Doc. 2 G/7(q) (Apr. 16, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note 8, at 448.
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Similar drafting proposals were made by Australia (“for promoting the
development and revision of the rules and principles of international law”)19
and Liberia (“[t]he General Assembly shall also initiate studies which should
lead to the Codification of International Law”).20 For its part, Lebanon
somewhat presciently proposed the creation of:
a permanent Committee of Jurists whose function shall be
the periodic codification or consolidation of existing
principles of international law together with the
modifications thereof which shall be deemed necessary from
time to time.21
In its view, “[i]t [was] obvious that the precise formulation of the law of
nations, brought always up-to-date in accordance with the development of
the theory and practice of that law, [would] be a potent instrument for the
maintenance of international peace and security.”22
Iran proposed a similar amendment to Chapter XII (Transitional
Arrangements) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, to which the following
subparagraph would be added:
A Committee of qualified Jurists should be established to
draw up a code of International Law.23
Some delegations went further and proposed endowing the General
Assembly with the power to legislate international law. Hence, the
Philippines was of the view that:
The General Assembly should be vested with the legislative
authority to enact rules of international law which should
become effective and binding upon the members of the
Organization after such rules have been approved by a
majority vote of the Security Council . . . In the exercise of

19 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
Submitted on Behalf of Australia, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(1) (May 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note
8, at 546.
20 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Memorandum of the Liberian Government on
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(a) (May 2, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note
8, at 465.
21 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Lebanon’s Suggestions on the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals Which will be Submitted for Discussion in the United Nations Conference on International
Organization to be Held in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(c) (May 2, 1945), in
Documents Vol. III, supra note 8, at 473.
22
23

Id.

U.N. Conference on International Organization, Amendments Presented by the Delegation of
Iran to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(m) (May 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra
note 8, at 556.
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this legislative authority the General Assembly may codify
the existing rules of international law with such changes as
the Assembly may deem proper.24
Likewise, Ecuador envisaged the establishment of a “juridical
community in which the Assembly and Council can perform the legislative
and executive functions, respectively . . . ,”25 and hence proposed the
following amendment to be included among the powers of the General
Assembly:
The power to establish or progressively amend the principles
and rules of law which are to govern the relations between
the States lies with the General Assembly, through a twothirds majority of its members. The instruments embodying
those principles and rules shall only come into compulsory
effect for all members of the Organization when they are
ratified by a number equivalent to a two-thirds part of it.26
D.

Consideration in Committee II/2

What is clear from the above is that by the time Committee II/2 turned
its attention to the functions and powers of the General Assembly, it already
had before it a number of proposals for the expansion of such functions to
include the development of international law (whether by way of the
authority to revise existing treaties or more generally). The basis of the
discussion was paragraph 6 of Chapter V, section B, of the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals, which read:
The General Assembly should initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting international
cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of
adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.27

24 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Proposed Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals Submitted by the Philippine Delegation, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(k) (May 5, 1945), in Documents
Vol. III, supra note 8, at 536–37.
25 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Delegation of Ecuador to the United Nations
Conference on International Organization, U.N. Doc. 2 G/7(p) (May 1, 1945), in Documents Vol. III,
supra note 8, at 404.
26
27

Id. at 427.

U.N. Conference on International Organization, The United Nations Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals for a General International Organization, U.N. Doc. 1 G/P, in Documents Vol. III, supra note
8, at 6.
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An initial step was taken at the third meeting of Committee II/2, held on
9 May 1945, when the United States, on behalf of the four “sponsoring”
powers and France, proposed the following amendment to paragraph 6,
which was adopted without reservations:
The General Assembly should initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting international
cooperation in political, economic, social and cultural fields
to assist in the realization of human rights and basic
freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language,
religion or sex and also for the encouragement of the
development of international law.28
Subsequently, Committee II/2 requested Subcommittee A to review all
the written proposals and views expressed by delegations, together with the
amendment adopted on May, and to systematize all the issues raised therein
into a series of questions to be considered by the Committee.29 The
Subcommittee subsequently submitted a report containing several questions
organized under three categories of issues: (1) pertaining to the development
of the rules and principles of international law more generally; (2) concerning
the revision of treaties; and (3) relating to the power of the General Assembly
to formulate general conventions.30 Of the three, the second, concerning the
power to impose the revision of treaties, proved to be the most contentious.
1.

The Development of International Law: Recommendations
Versus Legislation

The first set of questions contrasted two approaches to developing
international law. On the one hand, the General Assembly of the future
organization would only have the power to initiate studies with a view to
making recommendations aimed at the development of the law. The
alternative approach was to endow the Assembly with legislative authority to
make and impose law. While the initial proposal by the Chinese delegation,
and those of several other delegations, had favored the more cautious
approach, several delegations (including, for example the Philippines, as
referred to above) had called for a more robust set of powers to be awarded
to the General Assembly. More than just a philosophical difference of
28 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of the Third Meeting of
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 203 II/2/8 (May 10, 1945), in 9 Documents of the United Nations Conference
on International Organizations 21–22 (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. IX] (emphasis added).
29 See U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Summary Report of the Eighth Meeting of
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 392 II/2/17 (May 18, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 53.
30 See U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Second Report of Subcommittee A, U.N.
Doc. 416 II/2/A/3 (May 18, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 346–48.
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approach, the two options reflected starkly different visions of the nature,
role, and powers of the international organization being established.
Four questions were developed, two for each approach. The questions
were put to the vote at the tenth meeting of Committee II/2, held on 21 May
1945. The official record of the meeting (reproduced below in extenso)
described the outcome as follows:
The Chairman put question 1 to the vote, as follows:
Should the Assembly be empowered to initiate studies
and make recommendations for the codification of
international law?
Decision: 27 affirmative votes, 8 negative; Question
1 affirmed;
The Chairman put question 2 to the vote, as follows:
Should the Assembly be empowered to initiate studies
and make recommendations for promoting the revision
of the rules and principles of international law?
Decision: 16 affirmative votes, 7 negative; Question
2 affirmed;
The Chairman put question 3 to the vote, as follows:
Should the Assembly be authorized to enact rules of
international law which should become binding upon
members after such rules shall have been approved by
the Security Council?
Decision: 1 affirmative vote, 26 negative; Question
3 negatived;
The Chairman put question 4 to the vote as follows:
Should it be provided that upon the failure of the
Security Council to act on such rules within a period
specified in the Charter, they should become effective
and binding, in the same manner as if they had been
approved by the Security Council?
Decision: no affirmative vote, 26 negative; Question
4 negatived.31
Therefore, by a series of votes the Committee rejected the possibility of
granting the General Assembly legislative powers, opting instead only for the
power to make recommendations, based on studies the Assembly had
31 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Summary Report of Tenth Meeting II/A, U.N.
Doc. 506 II/2/202 (May 23, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 69–70.
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previously initiated. The first two (affirmative) decisions also established, for
the first time, the two prongs of the scope ratione materiae of the
recommendations being envisaged, namely: for the “codification of
international law” and for what was then referred to as “promoting the
revision of the rules and principles of international law.” The concept of
“progressive development” had not yet found its way into the lexicon of the
conference.32
2.

Revision of Treaties

The proposal to grant the General Assembly the power to make
recommendations aimed at the further development of international law, first
proposed by the Chinese Government, gave rise to some debate both in the
Plenary and in Commission II. The source of contention was less the basic
idea, which faced little opposition, and arose more as a consequence of the
manner in which the debate was framed. From the beginning (including the
Chinese proposal), many of the proponents of granting the General Assembly
enhanced powers linked their proposals to the question of the “revision” of
existing rules of international law, particularly treaties, as a component of the
broader debate on peaceful change and adjustment of situations giving rise to
international disputes, which had arisen during the inter-war period.
Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations had granted the
Assembly of the League the authority to:
[F]rom time to time advise the reconsideration by Members
of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable
and the consideration of international conditions whose
continuance might endanger the peace of the world.
While the League Assembly never exercised such authority, the problem
of unfair or onerous treaties was the source of much tension at the
international level during the inter-war period, and in the case of one
particular treaty, the Versailles Treaty, lay at the origin of the return to war
(in Europe).
In referring to the “revision of the rules and principles of international
law,” the initial Chinese proposal at Dumbarton Oaks had resurrected the
possibility of such authority also being granted to the General Assembly of
the soon to be established United Nations. Some delegations, the Chinese
included, came to the San Francisco Conference with a vivid history of
grievances arising from the imposition of treaties enshrining hegemonic rule.
32 An early reference was to be found in an Ecuadorean proposal, dated 1 May 1945, which
referred to the power to “progressively amend the principles and rules of law.” See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
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For many such states, the promise of a new world order in the proposed
Charter of the United Nations implied the possibility of being released from
such treaties. They held out the hope that the General Assembly, like the
League Assembly before it, would be empowered to make peaceful
adjustments to the situations giving rise to conflict, including such situations
arising from the imposition of unfair treaties.
For example, Egypt maintained that:
with a view of harmonizing international relationships, we
suggest it as a duty of the Conference to prescribe principles
for the revision of treaties which have become inconsistent
with the new concept or world conditions and collective
security and might therefore become irritants and a possible
source of conflict.33
In the context of the work in Committee II/2, Egypt proposed a drafting
amendment to add, inter alia, the following to the powers of the General
Assembly:
to advise on the request of any member concerned the
reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable
and the consideration of international conditions whose
continuance might endanger the peace…34
Similarly, Lebanon expressed the view that:
[i]t is obvious that the precise formulation of the law of
nations, brought always up to date in accordance with the
development of the theory and practice of that law, will be a
potent instrument for the maintenance of international peace
and security.35
Haiti pointed out that:
[i]t does not seem superfluous to us to add here that
international law cannot remain static, no more than civil or
penal law. It must be capable of adapting itself to the
changing conditions of life of the peoples of the world.36
33 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Verbatim Minutes of the Third Plenary Session,
U.N. Doc. 22 P/7 (Apr. 29, 1945), in 1 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International
Organizations 236 (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. I].
34 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Report by the Officers on Grouping of
Suggested Modifications to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 326 II/2/7(2), annex 2 (May 12, 1945),
in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 315.
35 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Third Plenary
Session, U.N. Doc. 22 P/7 (Apr. 29, 1945), in Documents Vol. I, supra note 33, at 251 (emphasis added).
36 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Sixth Plenary
Session, U.N. Doc. 55 P/13 (May 2, 1945), in Documents Vol. I, supra note 33, at 443 (emphasis added).
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Subsequently (during the discussion in Committee II/2), Brazil
proposed that the Charter provide that:
[a]t the request of any contracting party to an executory
treaty, who alleges the total or partial caducity of the same,
or the injustice of its continuation, the Assembly by a twothirds majority shall invite one or the other contracting
parties to come to agreement with the first for the revision or
cancellation of such treaty. If any of the contracting parties
are not in agreement with the said revision or cancellation,
the other one or more contracting parties shall be authorized
to resort to the permanent international court of justice, in
order that the latter by judgment may decide if the treaty in
question has lost all or part of its compulsory force because
of the fact that the conditions determining its execution have
changed or that the treaty itself has become unjustly onerous
for one or the other of the parties.37
Belgium, responding to criticism expressed by France (see below),
observed that:
the Organization would give up a great part of its
possibilities for helping the peace if the General Assembly
were to exclude consideration of any dangerous situation
which might arise directly or indirectly out of certain
treaties.38
Other governments were strongly opposed to granting the General
Assembly the authority to impose adjustments of situations, including the
power to recommend the revision of treaties. For them, the possibility of
imposing the revision of treaties, necessarily against the will of one of more
parties thereto, was itself a potential source of instability, especially since the
collective security arrangement which emerged from the Second World War
was to be anchored in treaties (the most prominent of which being the Charter
itself). For them, the stability of treaties was of paramount importance.
Hence, France, drawing the opposite historical lesson from the existence
of Article 19, recalled that:
in Article 19 of the Covenant were special provisions
concerning the revision of treaties by the League. There is
37 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Report by the Officers on Grouping of
Suggested Modifications to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 326 II/2/7(2), annex 2 (May 12, 1945),
in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 313–14.
38 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of
Commission II, U.N. Doc. 1151 II/17 (June 22, 1945), in 8 Documents of the United Nations Conference
on International Organizations 207 (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. VIII].
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nothing of that kind in the Charter, and this for a very
important reason: Article 19 was used by Hitler and the other
dictators as a basis for their territorial claims, and if the
Assembly were competent to revise treaties at any time, you
might have agitation for revision of this or that treaty, and
there would never be any stability in the treaties. And what
would happen to our own peace which we are going to draft,
if at any time afterwards there can be agitation with a view
to its revision?39
Later on, during the ensuing debate in Committee II/2, the French
delegation once again expressed the view that:
the Conference was trying to change the kind of world where
might is righ[t], in which we have lived too long, and if we
begin by including an article on treaty revision in the
Charter, we shall undermine that attempt. Some treaties give
immediate benefits and impose later obligations; if those
later obligations are inconvenient, what government could
resist the temptation to ask for their revision once it has
reaped the early benefits? What individual, a party to a
contract, would allow his parliament to intervene and break
the contract, and how could a country permit the intervention
of the Assembly in the case of a treaty? Only force majeure
or the action of a court could make such a change.40
Colombia opposed any interpretation that gave the General Assembly
the power to recommend the revision of treaties and indicated that it should
be “stated very clearly that, once and for all, here in San Francisco this
problem of the revision of treaties is dead and buried.”41
The delegate from the Soviet Union:
strongly urged the view that inclusion of any provision on
revision of treaties in the Charter would be unsound. To do
so would be to contradict the principle of the sovereignty of
states upon which the Organization was to be established. He
expressed the deep conviction of his Delegation that the task
of the Conference was not to shatter the foundations of

39 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of
Commission II, U.N. Doc. 1151 II/17 (June 22, 1945), in Documents Vol. VIII, supra note 38, at 202.
40 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Summary Report of Eighteenth Meeting of
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 771 II/2/41 (June 3, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 140
(emphasis in original).
41 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of
Commission II, U.N. Doc. 1151 II/17 (June 22, 1945), in Documents Vol. VIII, supra note 383838, at 210.
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treaties and sow doubts, but to strengthen respect for treaties.
It would be particularly dangerous to insert in the Charter a
provision which would undoubtedly undermine all the
system of agreements with enemy states already concluded
and of peace treaties yet to be signed. … A provision on
treaty revision would obviously be used by the enemy states
to elude the obligations which will be imposed on them.
Thus the Conference might shatter the edifice constructed
with so much effort and blood.42
The delegate of Czechoslovakia indicated that:
although his country had faithfully executed its every
international obligation in the years before 1938, it had
nevertheless been constantly the object of the aggressive
designs of its neighbors. He attributed this to the terms of
Article 19 of the League Covenant, which had provided a
sort of legal cover for the policies of disruption and nonfulfillment of such countries as Germany and Hungary. His
Government was therefore unequivocally opposed to the
insertion in the Charter, before treaties of peace had even
been concluded, of a specific reference to treaty revision
. . . .43
Peru confirmed that “[h]is Government could not accept the inclusion
in the Charter of an article on treaty revision.”44 The delegation of Chile:
reminded the Committee that the primary object of the
Conference was to seek to guarantee peace and security. To
this end the Delegation of Chile had voted in favor of giving
the Assembly power to make recommendations for the
development and codification of international law; and he
wished to affirm categorically that if a provision for treaty
revision were written into the Charter, peace and security
would be imperiled, for respect for treaties is the unalterable
basis of peace and security. The intangibility of treaties must
be respected, because it must not be forgotten that the
surviving fifth and sixth columns of Fascism would seize on
any pretext for revision, as would the makers of armaments
on anything which would renew international instability. He
42 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Eighteenth Meeting of
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 771 II/2/41 (June 3, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 138–39.
43

Id. at 139.

44

Id. at 140.
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considered that frontier treaties, which have been frequently
mentioned in this debate, become historical facts once they
are fulfilled . . . .45
The issue was considered in Committee II/2, over three meetings held
from 1 to 4 June 1945, on the basis of three questions formulated by
Subcommittee A. The questions read as follows:
B. Revision of treaties
1. Should the Assembly be empowered to examine treaties
which appear to be inapplicable and to make
recommendations to the governments (parties thereto) and to
the Security Council with respect to such treaties?
2. Should the Assembly, at the request of any member
concerned be empowered to recommend the reconsideration
of treaties which become inapplicable?
3. Should the Assembly, at the request of any party to an
executory treaty claiming its inapplicability or the injustice
of its continuation, be empowered to invite the contracting
parties to agree to the revision or cancellation of the treaty?46
Upon turning to the discussion of the substance of the three questions,
the delegate of the United States took the floor to explain that
although he had originally contemplated a specific allusion
in the Charter to the question of revision of treaties, he had
foregone this in favor of the broad version of paragraph 6 of
Section B, Chapter V, put forward by the four sponsoring
governments and France [on 9 May 1945]. It was
inconsistent to launch an international Organization based
on international integrity and at the same time to intimate
any lack of respect for the instruments through which
international integrity functions, namely, treaties. He
recognized the objections to identifying treaties as such with
this paragraph and held that the concern of the Assembly was
not with treaties per se, but with adjusting conditions which
might impair peace and good relations between nations.
Considerations of the general welfare may call for a
recommendation that a treaty be respected rather than
revised. He submitted that it was wiser not to connect the
broad version of paragraph 6 with any specific definition
45 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 790 II/2/42 (June 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 42, at 149.
46 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Second Report of Subcommittee A, 3, U.N. Doc.
416 II/2/A/3 (May 18, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 30, at 347.
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regarding treaty revision. The phrase “the peaceful
adjustment of any situations, regardless of origin,” in his
view, should not be interpreted to mean that the subject of
treaty revision was foreclosed to the Assembly. If treaties
gave rise to situations which the Assembly deemed likely to
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among
nations, it could make recommendations in respect of these
situations.47
The debate on the matter continued for several meetings. In the end, the
Committee voted not to consider the three questions proposed by the
Subcommittee, in lieu of the interpretation of paragraph 6 offered by the
United States, which was accepted by the Committee, including the
proponents of an express reference to the revision of treaties.48 The power of
the General Assembly to recommend “measures for the peaceful adjustment
of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the
general welfare or friendly relations among nations . . . ,” including
situations arising from treaties (under the interpretation offered by the United
States), was subsequently incorporated in Article 14 of the Charter. While
the idea of including an express reference to the revision of treaties was laid
to rest, as will be described shortly, the concept of “revision” continued to
find favour among some delegations in the broader context of the general
rules and principles of international law.
3.

The Power to Formulate General Conventions

The third strand of issues identified by Subcommittee A related to
proposals that the General Assembly be empowered to formulate general
conventions for adoption by states. The Subcommittee prepared two
questions. The first question read:
Should the General Assembly be empowered to submit
general conventions for the consideration of states which
form part of the United Nations Organization and, should the
47 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of
Committee II/2, 2–3, U.N. Doc. 748 II/2/39 (June 2, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 127–
28.
48 See the views of Belgium, id. at 128 (“while he would have liked that treaties should be
specifically mentioned, he expressed his support of the interpretation of paragraph 6 given by the Delegate
of the United States . . . .”), and Egypt, id. at 128–29 (“the three questions formulated for discussion by
the Committee should be withdrawn because they were amply covered by the interpretation of paragraph
6 given by the delegate of the United States.”), and Mexico, id. at 130 (“seconded the motion of the
Delegate of Egypt, on condition that the remarks of the Delegate of the United States should go on record
as requested.”).
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occasion arise, for the consideration of other states, with a
view to securing their approval in accordance with their
appropriate constitutional procedures?49
The question had arisen following an amendment proposed by Belgium,
which explained that while the substance of the proposal was, in part, covered
by the text of paragraph 6 (of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals), as
subsequently amended, on 9 May 1945, on the basis of the proposal by the
four powers and France, the element in the last phrase of the proposal “was
intended to ensure that states members of the Organization should be required
to place general conventions recommended and submitted by the Assembly
before their national parliaments for due consideration.”50 While some
delegations were of the view that the General Assembly was not the
appropriate forum for undertaking the drafting of conventions, others
“wished it to be quite clear that the power of initiating conventions lay with
the Assembly, although, as a practical method, it could set up special
committees to do the drafting.”51 The question was put to a roll-call vote, and
although 25 delegations voted in favor, and 13 against, the Chair ruled that
the proposed amendment had failed under the two-thirds rule.52
The second question, which was made up of four parts, concerned the
possibility of the General Assembly being granted the power to impose
conventions. All four sub-questions were put to the vote and failed.53 As with

49

Second Report of Subcommittee A, supra note 30, at 347–48.

50

U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of
Committee II/2, 2, U.N. Doc. 536 II/2/24 (May 24, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 75.
51

Id.

52

U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Twelfth Meeting of
Committee II/2, 2, U.N. Doc. 571 II/2/27 (May 25, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 80.
Despite the failure (by one vote) of an express reference being included in the Charter, the power of the
General Assembly to recommend treaties for the consideration of the member States of the United Nations
was later anticipated in the Statute of the ILC, adopted in 1947. See G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947),
amended by G.A. Res. 485 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950) and G.A. Res. 984 (X) (Dec. 3, 1955) and G.A. Res. 985
(X) (Dec. 3, 1955) and G.A. Res. 36/39 (Nov. 18, 1981). In the intervening period, the Assembly has on
numerous occasions concluded international conventions, including (but not limited to) when acting under
Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter.
53

The four sub-questions were as follows:

a. Should the General Assembly have the power of imposing conventions when, in its opinion, these
are mere corollaries of principles it already recognizes as compulsory, or when it believes that that
general observance of the obligations embodied in the conventions is necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security?
Decision: Affirmative votes 0, negative votes many (not counted). Question negatived.
b. Should this power also be extended to include other conventions?
Decision: Affirmative votes 0, negative votes many (not counted). Question negatived.
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the proposal to grant the General Assembly legislative powers, the possibility
of it being empowered to impose international law in circumvention of
national constitutional requirements did not find favor with delegations.
4.

Progressive Development

Following Committee II/2’s approval, on 9 May 1945, of the proposal
by the four powers and France that the General Assembly should, in
principle, be empowered to initiate studies and make recommendations for
the codification of international law, as well as for promoting the revision of
the rules and principles of international law, and taking into account the
subsequent outcome of the Committee’s consideration of the various
questions prepared by Subcommittee A (discussed above), the task of
drafting the text of the corresponding provision to be included in the Charter
was carried out by Subcommittee B.
In its report, of 5 June 1945, the Subcommittee reported that it had been
unable to agree on a single formulation, and accordingly had prepared the
following two alternative formulations for the consideration of Committee
II/2:
First . . . and also for the codification of international law,
the encouragement of its development and the promotion of
its revision. . . .
Second . . . and also for the encouragement of the
progressive development of international law and for its
codification.54
The Subcommittee had been divided on the point whether it was
essential, in view of the affirmative vote on a question before Committee II/2
at its meeting on 21 May 1945, specifically to include the word “revision.”
Some members had felt that the words “progressive development”

c. As regards member states, should the Assembly have the power to decide that such conventions
shall come into force under the same conditions that may be provided for the coming into force of
amendments to the Charter?
Decision: Affirmative votes 0, negative votes many (not counted). Question negatived.
d. Should the General Assembly have the power to impose such conventions on non-member states?
Decision: Affirmative votes 21, negative votes 16. Question negatived [under the two-thirds
rule].
Summary Report of Twelfth Meeting of Committee II/2, supra note 52, at 80–81.
54 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Third Report of Subcommittee II/2/B, 2, U.N.
Doc. 793 II/2/B/10 (June 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 420 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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adequately covered Committee II/2’s intention. The Subcommittee had
therefore agreed to send alternative versions to the Committee to choose
from. The first alternative (“revision”) had been supported by five members,
and the second alternative (“progressive development”) by three members of
the Subcommittee.55
The majority of opinion in the Subcommittee was reversed in
Committee II/2, when the two alternatives were put to a vote. The first
alternative attracted only 8 votes, while the second passed with 28 votes.56
The summary of the views expressed, during the debate in the Committee, in
favour of each alternative is worth reproducing in extenso as it sheds light on
the intended meaning of the final text of Article 13 (and demonstrates how
close the provision came to referring to “revision”):
In support of the specific mention of revision, as in the first
alternative draft set out in the report, it was urged that it had
been suggested to Committee II/2, at its meeting on May 21,
that “development” necessarily implied “revision”, and that
the Committee, by its vote, had rejected this interpretation,
showing that it recognized a distinction between the two.
“Development,” it was said, meant adding to existing rules;
“revision” meant modifying them. Moreover, “revision”
should be mentioned in order to avoid the rigidity implied by
the mention of “codification” of international law without
provision for modification.
In support of the use of the words “progressive
development,” as in the second alternative draft; it was said
that, juxtaposed as they were with codification, they implied
modifications of as well as additions to existing rules. It was
also argued that the first alternative draft, especially in its
French version, virtually obligated the Assembly to proceed
to revision of international law, an inappropriate task for a
political body. “Progressive development” would establish
a nice balance between stability and change, whereas
“revision” would lay too much emphasis on change.57
Article 13(1)(a) was later included in the text of the Charter, with the
second alternative formulation, as proposed by the Subcommittee and
approved by Committee II/2 on 7 June 1945.

55

Id.

56

U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Twenty-First Meeting of
Committee II/2, 2, U.N. Doc. 848 II/2/46 (June 7, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 178.
57

Id. at 177–78 (emphasis added).
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III. CONCLUSION: THE BALANCE BETWEEN STABILITY AND
CHANGE
Through a drawn out, and at times contentious, process the drafters of
the Charter established a framework for the General Assembly’s future work
in the development of international law that took into account the lessons of
the past, while providing a basis for gradual change in the future. This rested
on two assumptions. First, the focus of the Assembly’s new mandate would
be on the development of general rules and principles of international law,
and not the adjustment of any particular existing treaty regime. An unfettered
power to impose the revision of established treaty arrangements was
expressly rejected as being antithetical to stability. In its place, an
understanding was reached by which the General Assembly retained a
residual power, under the terms of Article 14, to recommend “the peaceful
adjustment of any situation…likely to impair the general welfare or friendly
relations among nations,” which could include a situation arising from a
particular existing treaty arrangement.
Second, in contemplating the further development of international law,
the emphasis would be placed on stability, and in particular the stability of
the treaty regime on which the new world order rising from the ashes of war
would be based. At the same time, there was a recognition among the drafters
that the mere codification of existing rules could prevent the evolution of the
law necessary to take into account new realities and aspirations. The failure
to do so could itself be a source of instability. The challenge facing the
drafters was to find the right balance between stability and change––a
Goldilocks point between consolidating the acquis of the law while looking
to the future. But what kind of change was to be permitted, without upsetting
the overall balance? What emerged was a carefully calibrated process of
gradual change. The General Assembly was expressly not granted the
authority to legislate. Furthermore, while the power to impose wholesale
revision was also rejected, the end result nonetheless retained a strong quasirevisionary element (a type of “revision-light”).
The key to the understanding the latter point lies in an appreciation of
the meaning of change implied in the notion of “progressive development.”
As the Chair of Committee II/2 noted, in explaining the vote in favour of the
final formulation, change implied not only the incremental addition of new
rules, as suggested by the word “development,” but also, from time to time,
the modification of existing rules, which was envisaged by the addition of
the adjective “progressive.” While sharing a similar meaning to “revision”
(modification of existing rules) the composite concept of “progress
development” was, to belabor the metaphor, neither too hot nor too cold, but
just right, since in the view of the participating governments (no doubt, also
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influenced by the general reception of the concept during the negotiations)
the word “revision” would have skewed the overall balance towards change.

